Posts Tagged ‘spw’

21st International Workshop on Security Protocols

Wednesday, March 20th, 2013

For the last couple of days I have been at the Security Protocols Workshop which was conveniently located a short cycle ride away. I thoroughly enjoyed it and will definitely be coming back next year (hopefully with a short paper to present). I want to mention some of my  favourite new (to me) ideas which were presented. I am only covering them briefly so if it looks interesting go and read the paper (when it comes out at some unspecified point in the future or find someone with a copy of the pre-proceedings).

Towards new security primitives based on hard AI problems – Bin B. Zhu, Jeff Yan

The core idea here is that if there are problems which computers can’t solve but humans can (e.g. 2D Captchas) then these can be used to allow humans to input their passwords etc. in such a way that a computer trying to input passwords in has no idea what password it is inputting (CaRP). This means that on each attempt the attacker gains nothing because they don’t know what password they tried as they just sent a random selection of click events which the server then interpreted as a password using information that the attacker does not have without human assistance. This helps against online brute force attacks, particularly distributed attacks which are hard to solve with blacklisting without also locking the legitimate user out. It also helps as part of the ‘authentication is machine learning‘ approach as accounts which are flagged as being used suspiciously can be required to login using a CaRP which requires human input and so mitigates automated attacks in a similar way to requiring the use of a mobile number and sending it a text (though it is less strong than that – it does require less infrastructure). Additionally I think that if a particular Captcha scheme is broken then the process of breaking each one will still be computationally intensive and so this should still rate limit the attacker.

Remote device attestation with bounded leakage of secrets – Jun Zhao, Virgil Gligor, Adrian Perrig, James Newsome

This is a neat idea where if the hardware of a device is controlled such that its output bandwidth is strictly limited then it is still possible to be certain that the software on it has not been compromised even if an attacker can install malware on it and has full control of the network. This works by having a large pool of secrets on the device which are updated in a dependent way each epoch and there is not enough bandwidth in an epoch to leak enough data to construct the pool of secrets outside the device. Then the verifier can send the device a new program to fill its working RAM and request a MAC over the memory and secrets storage and this cannot be computed off the device or on the device without filling the RAM with the requested content and so when the MAC is returned the verifier knows the full contents of the hardware’s volatile state and so if it was compromised it no longer is.

Spraying Diffie-Hellman for secure key exchange in MANETs – Ariel Stulman, Jonathan Lahav, and Avraham Shmueli

This idea is for use in providing confidentiality of communication on mobile ad-hoc networks. Since the network is always changing and comprised of many nodes it is hard for an attacker to compromise all the nodes on all paths between two nodes which wish to communicate confidentiality. The idea is to do Diffie-Hellman but split the message into multiple pieces with a hash and send each message via a different route to the recipient. If any one of those pieces gets through without being man-in-the-middled then the attack has failed. In a random dynamically changing network it is hard for an attacker to ensure that. Though not impossible and so a very careful analysis needs to be done to mitigate those risks in practice.

Layering authentication channels to provide covert communication – Mohammed H. Almeshekah, Mikhail Atallah, Eugene H. Spafford

The idea here is that some additional information can be put in the authentication information such as typing <password> <code word> rather than just <password> in the password field and hence transmitting <code word> to the bank which can have many meanings, e.g. have three different code words for 3 levels of access (read only, transactions, administrative) and one for coercion. I particularly liked the idea of being able to tell the bank ‘help someone is coercing me to do this, make everything look as normal but take steps to reverse things afterwards and please send the police’.


There were also lots of other interesting ideas some of which I had seen before in other contexts. I thought I made some useful contributions to discussions and so maybe this whole PhD in computer security thing might work out. There were some really friendly welcoming people there and I already knew a bunch of them as they were CL Security Group people.